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ISRAEL'S GOALS IN THE PRESENT
CONFLICT
Israel must show its military strength in order to deter terror attacks.
By Nadav Morag 
LOS ANGELES –
The Israeli wars with Hizbullah in Lebanon and with the Palestinians in Gaza must be seen in the context
of the pressing Israeli need to reestablish some semblance of a deterrent capacity.
Israel's national security policy has historically been based on the understanding that true
security could only be obtained once its neighbors agreed to accept it as a legitimate state.
But since its founding in 1948, Israel has never been able to achieve this overarching goal
- despite important advances, such as the peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and with
Jordan in 1994.
In the absence of true peace, Israel's goal has been the
maintenance of overwhelming strength that could effectively
dissuade attacks of any kind - whether through conventional
warfare, supporting terrorism directed at Israel, or, more recently,
threatening to strike Israel with missiles carrying conventional or
nonconventional payloads.
Following a policy based on deterrence is "high maintenance" and
requires the periodic reinforcement of that message lest the
enemy come to a conclusion that one is no longer capable of
maintaining a posture of overwhelming strength or, no less
important, the commitment to use that military power when
necessary.
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raids in response to terrorist attacks. This deterrence policy had succeeded in achieving
periods of relative quiet for Israel during which the country was able to develop
economically and socially. However, Israel's deterrence capabilities have become
increasingly eroded, primarily as a result of the changing nature of warfare.
It should be made clear that at no time in its history, has Israel ever been safer from the
threat of a full-scale conventional Arab-Israeli war. Egypt and Jordan are at peace with
Israel and, while Israel's ties with those countries is far from ideal, it does not appear that
military force will factor into those relationships in the future.
Iraq is clearly not going to be a military threat to Israel for a considerable period of time, if
ever. Iran's policies are of great concern to Israel, but purely within the sphere of ballistic
missiles as the Iranian Army lacks the capacity to launch a conventional attack against
distant Israel. Syria is still an implacable and dangerous enemy, but its conventional
military threat to Israel is limited. Of more concern is Syria's large arsenal of missiles,
which could cause considerable devastation.
At the same time, Israel's deterrence capability is presently extremely low. This is largely
because of Israel's inability over the past three decades to decisively defeat terrorist and
guerrilla threats, whether emanating from the Palestinian territories or Lebanon. As
Americans well know from experience in Iraq, defeating an organized state with a
conventional military force is one thing, and defeating ragtag forces of terrorists and
guerrillas with minimal infrastructures and no territory to defend is quite another.
Moreover, on two separate occasions, in the spring of 2000 when Israel withdrew from
southern Lebanon and in the summer of 2005 when Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip,
Israel has evacuated territory under what was perceived by the Arab world and Iran to be
military pressure exerted upon it. While one might argue as to whether Israel was truly
"withdrawing under fire," the important point is that, in politics and policymaking, people act
on perceptions, and the Israeli withdrawals were universally perceived in the Middle East
as acts of weakness.
Israel's adversaries consequently moved to exploit Israel's perceived weakness and
achieve their long sought-after goal of destroying the Jewish state. Yasser Arafat, then the
Palestinian leader, made it clear in launching the Al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000 that
Israel was in decline and one final push was all that was needed to achieve total victory
over it.
Mr. Arafat, of course, was proved wrong (at great cost to Israelis and even greater cost to
Palestinians), but Israel's inability to stamp out terrorism from the West Bank or prevent
rocket attacks from the newly evacuated Gaza Strip has continued to erode its ability to
deter its enemies.
Both current military clashes with Hizbullah and the Palestinians are destructive to civilians
in Lebanon and Gaza because the fighting is taking place inside urban areas. But that's
because the Palestinian groups and Hizbullah routinely use these areas as bases from
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The targeting of roads and bridges in Lebanon and Gaza is also designed to deny the
enemy mobility. At the same time, the targeting of roads and bridges, power plants, and, in
the case of Lebanon, ports and airports, as well as the cutting off of Gaza and Lebanon
from the outside world, is also designed to illustrate Israel's overwhelming military might. It
must convince not only Hizbullah and the Palestinian groups that they should abandon
their attacks on Israel, but also send a broader regional message that proxy wars against
Israel executed by Iran and Syria will no longer be tolerated.
In order for Israel to achieve its goal of deterrence capacity in Lebanon and Gaza, it must
achieve two immediate objectives.
First, Israel must continue both military campaigns to the point that neither Hizbullah nor
the Palestinians in Gaza are able to launch rockets and missiles at Israel. This requires
that the international community give Israel time in Lebanon, so that it can severely
damage Hizbullah's ability to launch rockets and missiles against Israel and cripple the
organization's ability to rule southern Lebanon.
Similarly, Israel must continue its ongoing operations in Gaza until the Palestinian militants'
ability to operate is so severely disrupted, and their personnel so denuded through Israeli
arrests and assassinations, that they agree to cease launching attacks against Israel.
Second, the present crisis on both fronts cannot be brought to a close without Syria and
Iran paying some price for their continued arming, funding, and training of Hizbullah and
Palestinian terror groups.
Keeping the international community at bay in order to accomplish the first goal, while
actively engaging with it in order to accomplish the second goal will require some
impressive juggling on the part of Israel's leaders.
• Nadav Morag is chair of the department of political science at the University of Judaism in
Los Angeles and lectures at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. He previously
served as a senior director at the Israeli National Security Council for Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon.
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